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1Handbook on Congressional Oversight
IntroductIon
This handbook summarizes the findings and implications of recent research on 
legislative oversight in countries with presidential forms of government. It also 
updates and revises good practice in parliamentary systems. The full research 
findings and their implications can be found in Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick 
Stapenhurst Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight, which was 
sponsored by GOPAC and the World Bank Institute and published in 2013 by 
Routledge.
The importance of legislative oversight and its impact on corruption is proven. 
Reduced corruption leads to enhanced economic development and increased 
living standards (see Box 1). Legislative oversight depends on oversight tools, 
facilitating conditions and the socio-political context within which the legislature 
operates.
this handbook proceeds as follows:
It first demonstrates how legislative oversight leads to reduced corruption 
by highlighting the importance of oversight tools, facilitating conditions and 
contextual factors. It then examines the link between accountability and the 
type of government and notes that what works – and why – is different in 
parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential systems.
A framework is subsequently presented which examines oversight tools, facili-
tating conditions and context factors. Internal tools (e.g., standing committees, 
question period, censure), external oversight mechanisms (e.g., ombuds offices, 
supreme audit institutions), facilitating conditions (e.g., legislative library and 
research staff) and contextual factors (e.g., form of government, political parties 
and electoral system), are distinguished.
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BoX 1: corruPtIon And EconoMIc GroWtH
Research has affirmed significant negative impact of corruption on eco-
nomic growth. Mauro’s (1997) examination of more than a 100 countries 
offered a quantitative estimate of this effect. He found that if a given 
country was to improve its corruption score by 2.38 points on a ten-
point scale, its annual per capita GDP growth would rise by over half a 
percentage point (Mauro 1997, p. 91). This means, for example, that if a 
country like Yemen could have reduced its corruption in 2001 to levels 
of that in Jordan or Oman, its GDP per capita would be more than 45 
higher than (US $2,105 vs. US $1,360).
Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs (forthcoming) found that perceived 
corruption declines as the number of oversight tools increases and the 
form of government becomes more parliamentary.
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legislative oversight and corruption
An important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption is its form of government–pres-
idential, semi-presidential or parliamentary. In parliamentary systems the head of government is 
not the head of state, voters cast their ballots in legislative elections, and the party or coalition 
that wins a majority of parliamentary seats has the right to form the (executive branch of the) 
government. In this kind of system, the executive remains in office only for as long as it enjoys 
the support (confidence) of a majority of the parliamentarians. In presidential systems, the head 
of state (the president) is also the head of the government and is elected by the voters for a fixed 
term in office. In this kind of system the legislature is also elected for a fixed term in office, it 
cannot be dissolved by the executive and, in turn, it lacks the power to dismiss the executive. In 
semi-presidential systems, the executive power is shared by the President and the Prime Minister. 
The President is directly elected by the voters, while the Prime Minister is the leader of the largest 
party in the legislature and remains in office as long as it enjoys the confidence of the legislature.
Some experts argue that presidential form of government is the most problematic. It is believed 
to be more likely to experience a breakdown of constitutional order and to be associated with 
higher levels of corruption. Additional research on these and related topics has shown instead 
that the highest levels of corruption are recorded in countries with a semi-presidential form of 
government (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012).
The World Bank Institute (WBI) and the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corrup-
tion (GOPAC) have recently highlighted that it is a policy process that defines the relationship 
between legislative oversight and corruption. Legislative oversight comprises of oversight tools 
that a legislature adopts plus supporting conditions and the socio-political context. Desired 
policy outcome is reduced corruption and input is legislative oversight. This notion is presented 
in Diagram 1. 
diagram 1: explanation of the relationship between legislative oversight and corruption                 
oversight tools &  
facilitating conditions
reduced 
corruption
Contextual factors
Legislative  
oversight
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EvolvInG AccountABIlIty –  
IMPlIcAtIons for lEGIslAtIvE ovErsIGHt
Accountability exists between an individual or institution and the actions per-
formed by them. These actions are subject to the oversight of another individual 
or institution.
There are two stages of accountability: answerability and enforcement. Answer-
ability refers to the obligation on answering questions based on decisions. 
Enforcement, is the discretion to sanction institutions or individuals responsible 
for action. Answerability without enforcement and sanctions without enforcement 
significantly diminish accountability. 
There are three types of accountability: horizontal, vertical and diagonal. An 
aspect of diagonal is social accountability1. Experts differ on the definition of 
accountability because of the varying political contexts. This section highlights 
accountability in different forms of government. 
current view of accountability
Accountability comprises of four components (see Diagram 2):
1. horizontal accountability 
Abuses by public agencies and branches of government are checked by State 
institutions, such as the legislature and anti-corruption agencies.
2. vertical accountability
The mean through which officials are enforced to perform effectively by citizens, 
mass media, and civil society.
3. diagonal accountability
Citizens are directly engaged in horizontal accountability institutions. Limited 
effectiveness of civil society’s watch dog function is augmented by breaking state’s 
monopoly on responsibility for official executive oversight.
4. social accountability
Accountability is ensured by civic engagement. See Box 2.
Regardless of the form of government or accountability, the legislature plays a 
crucial role in promoting government accountability.
A typology of accountability is developed in this handbook. This typology 
recognizes the different legislative oversight mechanisms in horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal notions of accountability and these mechanisms are then classified 
as having high enforcement/sanctions capacity or low enforcement/
1 All four types have emerged from different schools of thinking, and little has been done to 
synthesize the different concepts. Moreover, there are conflicting definitions of what each 
of these types of accountability are, resulting in a confused and disjointed literature and 
associated difficulty in applying the concepts of accountability to practical governance issues. 
One reason for this confusion is that the notion of accountability means different things in 
different political concepts.
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sanctions capacity (see Table 1). This typology can help legislatures in several ways. First, it focuses 
their efforts in improving oversight by concentrating on those mechanisms where they themselves 
have high enforcement/sanctions capacity (such as legislative committees, parliamentary hearings, 
or interpellations) or which they can establish (such as freedom of information laws). Second, 
where other agencies and organizations have high enforcement/sanctions capacity, legislatures 
can reap potentially greater oversight benefits than if they were to concentrate their efforts on 
developing or improving those mechanisms where there is lower enforcement/sanctions capacity 
(such as blue ribbon panels and ombuds offices). 
diagram 2: current concepts of Accountability                
Horizontal Accountability 
executive Legislature | oversight
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Accountability 
social  
Accountability
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BoX 2: socIAl AccountABIlIty
Social accountability initiatives are as varied and different as participatory budgeting, admin-
istrative procedures acts, social audits, and citizen report cards, all of which involve citizens in 
the oversight and control of government. This can be contrasted with government initiatives or 
entities, such as citizen advisory boards, which fulfill public functions.
The Development Assistance Committees Governance Network (2010a) has pointed out that 
– regardless of form of government – the recent emphasis on social accountability has perhaps 
undermined state accountability, and is urging the strengthening of ‘bridging channels’ that bring 
together both citizens and the State. The work of the Centre for the Future State, for example 
has emphasized that support for a single set of accountability actors (such as CSOs) alone are not 
particularly effective. Rather, support should be given to help develop ‘broad based alliances’ 
which bring together a range of actors with common interests in reform and which crosses the 
public-private divides.
In Uganda, for example, the USAID Linkages program aims to strengthen domestic linkages within 
the Parliament and between the Parliament, selected local governments and CSOs, as well as 
to build their capacities to improve service delivery and to enhance accountability (Tsekpo and 
Hudson, 2010). The program provides support to parliamentary committees and the shadow 
cabinet and also support outreach through policy forums and funding for CSOs to run local 
Budget Conferences in order to build citizen engagement in the budget process.
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table 1: typology of Accountability with illustrative examples                                                      
Accountability 
Within  
government 
(horizontal)
Accountability 
outside  
government 
(vertical)
Accountability 
outside  
government 
(diagonal)
Accountability 
outside  
government 
(social)
high  
enforcement/
sanctions 
capacity
Supreme audit    
institutions 
Legislative       
committees
Interpellations
Courts
Enforcement 
agencies
Elections
Professional 
Codes of 
Conduct
National/  
international 
standard-setting   
bodies
Accreditation     
agencies
Referenda
Parliamentary       
hearings
Admin. Review    
Councils
Public interest      
law
Freedom of      
Information      
laws
low  
enforcement/
sanctions 
capacity
Questions/ 
question period
Ombuds offices
Advisory boards
Inter-ministerial    
committees
Blue ribbon       
panels
‘Sunshine laws’
Policy research
Service delivery 
surveys
Investigative 
journalism
Citizens’ charters
Citizen Oversight 
committees
Civil society 
‘watchdog’ 
institutions
this typology has the following characteristics:
1. Accountability initiated by civil society 
has limited enforcement and sanctions 
capacity.
2. Strongest accountability institutions and 
mechanisms lie within the state.
3. Citizens and citizen groups and state 
accountability institutions are connected 
by Social (and diagonal) accountability.
the following factors are crucial for both 
civil society and state institutions to play an 
effective role:
1. Quality of democracy and political space 
for legislative oversight, freedom of 
expression and information.
2. Capacity of citizen engagement, civil society 
and state accountability institutions.
This section draws on Chapter 1 and 2 in 
Government Accountability and Legislative 
Oversight, by Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick 
Stapenhurst.
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AccountABIlIty And  
forM of GovErnMEnt
In Diagram 3, the difference between government accountability in presidential 
and parliamentary systems is shown. 
diagram 3: government Accountability in parliamentary and presidential systems 
Citizens
Legislative
executive
parliamentary presidential
Legislative executive
The Parliamentary system is characterized by the fusion of the executive and 
legislative branches of government. The head of government, Prime Minister 
or Chancellor, and cabinet are in legislature and depend on its confidence. 
Government can only remain in power as long as it has support of majority of 
parliament. See Diagram 4.
Presidential systems are characterized by the separation of powers. President 
and the cabinet cannot be members of parliament and do not require their 
confidence. Both the legislature and government are accountable directly to 
the public. See Diagram 5.
Semi-presidential systems are hybrids, sharing features of both parliamentary 
and presidential systems; see Diagram 6. 
3
8 Handbook on Congressional Oversight
All legislatures, regardless of type, have developed different oversight tools to address answer-
ability and enforceability. Answerability is enforced through legislative tools such as oversight 
committees, question period and the review/approval of certain government appointments. 
Enforceability is applied through tools such as the motions of confidences, motions of censure, 
impeachment and election/selection of cabinet ministers. The adaption of these tools depend 
on the form of government. 
In parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom, the legislature holds the government 
accountable through the no confidence motion, which, when passed, results in the resignation of 
the government. Members of cabinet are elected Members of Parliament and retain their seats 
throughout their tenure as ministers. They are thus ultimately accountable to the electorate. In 
Question period and interpellations, Members of Parliament question the government’s actions 
and demand answers on a daily basis. The appointment of ministers and senior officials are not 
normally reviewed by the Parliament, although occasionally, appointments of senior government 
officials may be reviewed. Committees exist, but – at least historically - are weak, with the notable 
exception of the Public Accounts Committee. 
In countries with presidential forms of government, such as the United States, the government is 
not subject to the no confidence motion. The executive arm of government cannot be dismissed 
through this motion. Furthermore, the Cabinet is selected by the President and its members 
cannot be legislators. However, their selection of both cabinet members and senior government 
officials is subject to review and ratification by the Senate. The President can be impeached 
only if he (or she) has violated the constitution or broken the law. This impeachment is through 
voting by House of Representatives and trial by Senate. A question period is not present in 
presidential system. Committees are stronger because of availability of resources and greater 
access to information.
In countries with a semi-presidential form of government, such as France, the nature of the 
executive-legislative relationship has some similarities with both parliamentary and presidential 
systems. The President cannot be voted out of office by a vote of no confidence, whereas the 
Prime Minister can be removed and replaced by the President if it is believed that the Prime 
Minister no longer commands the confidence of the legislature.
The availability, the variety and the incisiveness of oversight tools has a major impact on the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms of accountability. A general approximation for major oversight 
tools used by legislatures in different systems is presented in Table 2; these tools are examined 
in greater detail in the next section. 
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diagram 5: presidential form of government             
parlimentary system
FUSIoN oF PoWer
legislAtive brAnch eXecUtive brAnch
eXecUtive brAnch
CAbINeT
diagram 4: parliamentary form of government                      
Cabinet ministers are 
elected deputies
Pm & Cabinet sit in parliment 
and need its confidence 
Cabinet ministers appointed by  
President and ratified by parliament
presidential system
SePerATIoN oF PoWer
legislAtive brAnch eXecUtive brAnch
CAbINeTPreS
Cabinet and President do not sit in parliment 
or require parliament’s confidence
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table 2: overview of Accountability tools              
parliamentary presidential semi-presidential
Questions &  
interpellations ü - ü
committees ü 
(tend to be weak, 
except PAC)
ü
(tend to be strong) ü
special commissions ü ü ü
ombuds offices ü ü ü
supreme Audit institutions ü ü ü
no confidence votes ü - -
impeachment - ü -
selection of cabinet Elected Ratified -
review of Appointments - ü -
Source: Dubrow (2001)
diagram 6: semi-presidential form of government              
For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 1.
Duel executive  
(President and Pm with significant powers)
Pm and cabinet  
accountable to parliament 
and president
semi-presidential 
system
SePerATIoN oF PoWer
legislAtive brAnch
Government does not sit in Parliament but Pm 
and cabinet require Parliment’s confidence
eXecUtive brAnch
Pm
CAbINeT
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frAMEWork for EXAMInInG ovErsIGHt 
tools And contEXtuAl fActors
Within the context of oversight in the United States, Ogul (1976) suggested seven 
“opportunity factors” that promote or limit the potential for oversight. These 
are: legal authority or obligation, adequate staff, importance of the policy being 
overseen, the legislative committee system and its status within the legislature, 
the scope of oversight given executive-legislative relations, political party influ-
ences and the priorities of individual legislators. In Diagram 6, a diagrammatic 
framework that considers these variables is presented. It can be seen that the 
oversight tools, shaded in purple, can be internal to the legislature’s organization 
(committees, inquiries. etc.) or external (ombuds, supreme audit institution). 
Contextual and facilitating factors also comprise the external environment of 
legislature. Experts differ on which factors are important.
Internal oversight tools
The principal types of oversight tools are described in this section. 
diagram 7: legislative oversight factors: extended framework 
external environment
 Accountability institutions 
Supreme Audit Institutions, 
ombuds, Anti-corruption 
Agencies
political parties 
social legitimacy
electoral system
constitutional powers  
(form of government)
Access to information
conteXtUAl fActors
pArliAment internAl  
environment
CommITTee SYSTem
PArTY AND PArTY 
GroUPS
THe CHAmber  
(Questions, Interpellations, 
motions & Debates)
CommISSIoNS oF 
INQUIrY
mISSIoNS & rePorTS
RESEARCH CAPACITY  
Including access to  
independent sources  
of information
oversight tools
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Questions to government.
Question period is the most common oversight tool and can be found in parliamentary and 
semi-presidential but not in presidential systems. Questions can be asked orally or in writing. 
Written questions are not debated in parliament and written answers are provided. During the 
question period, oral questions are asked to the government. Additionally, questions can be 
deemed ‘urgent’, requiring a speedy government response
Interpellations
Interpellations are used to obtain information from the executive. Interpellations differ from 
question period in the following ways:
1. Rules permit an individual MP to submit questions but not interpellations. Interpellations 
have to be introduced either by a party’s parliamentary group or by a prescribed minimum 
number of MPs.
2. In question period, the executive is questioned by a MP on facts such as the correctness of 
information received by government in taking a decision, whether the government plans 
to share this information with legislature, and whether the government has undertaken or 
willing to undertake a specific course of action. In interpellation, objective is not only facts 
but, to obtain information on reasons and motivations behind a particular government 
decision. 
3. Unlike the question period, a government crisis and motions of censure  can be caused by 
interpellations.
motions
Legislatures employ two types of motions: 
1. motions for debate – This is used to scrutinize implementation of government policies 
and activities.
2. motions of censure – This is used to censure the government as a whole or the head 
of the government. They can have a wide range of consequences. In some presidential 
countries, such as Burundi, they are used only for record without any substantive conse-
quence. In other countries, such as Liberia, they can lead to the dismissal of the head of 
government.
committees
Committees are one of the most distinctive organizational features of legislatures worldwide. They 
can vary in size and number, but they invariably assist legislatures in performing their legislative 
and oversight functions. There are two types of committees:
1. permanent committees – These exist for the whole duration of legislature. 
2. Ad hoc/inquiry committees – These exist for a specific period of time and/or to examine 
a specific issue.
The size, number and nature (i.e., whether standing, ad hoc, inquiry) of committees are the 
dimensions that constitute and characterize a committee system. 
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A key difference between permanent committees and ad hoc committees is their duration. 
Another difference is the manner in which they are constituted. Permanent committees are es-
tablished either in constitution or in standing orders of the legislature. Ad hoc/inquiry committees 
are created by the legislature. 
The most popular specialized oversight committee is the Public Account Committee (PAC) - that 
reviews government expenditures and ensure accountability. It was once found exclusively in 
countries with a British institutional legacy (Commonwealth plus Ireland). Several countries 
outside the Commonwealth and/or with presidential forms of government (e.g., Nigeria, Liberia, 
Seychelles, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia) have since adopted PACs. 
Hearings are the most common oversight tools utilized by committees. Committees have the 
power to summon government ministers and senior officials, as well as other witnesses if deemed 
necessary, to gather information on government activity and policy implementation and keep 
the government accountable.
Special committees of Inquiry
Many legislatures have established committees (and sub-committees) of inquiry to perform 
specific investigations on particularly salient issues. These committees are not permanent. They 
are dissolved once it has performed the task for which it had been instituted or because their 
term has expired. 
missions and reports
In several countries (e.g., Benin, Burundi, Congo, Djibouti and Indonesia), legislatures can 
carry out fact-finding missions to gather the necessary information on the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of government policy implementation. In many other countries (e.g., Cyprus, 
Djibouti and South Korea), specific provisions compel the executive to submit regular reports 
to the legislature about the implementation of its policies and programs. These reports can be 
subject to debate in the plenary.
Internal oversight tools in Presidential systems
Variation in adoption of internal oversight tools among legislatures in presidential countries is 
indicated in Table 3. Legislatures have varying selection of internal oversight tools in their disposal. 
Namibia has all nine oversight tools. Committee hearings are used in 22 of the 24 countries 
under consideration, oral or written questions in 21 of 24 countries, committees of inquiry in 
20 countries and urgent questions in 19 countries. By contrast, missions are used only in nine 
of the 24 countries, motions for debate in 12 countries, reports in 15 countries and motions of 
censure in 14 countries.
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table 3: internal oversight tools in presidential countries            
country oral & written questions
Urgent  
questions interpell-ations
motion of 
debate
Argentina Y N Y N
benin Y Y Y Y
burundi Y N Y Y
chile Y Y Y N
congo Y Y Y Y
costa rica Y Y Y Y
cote d’ivoire Y Y N N
cyprus Y Y N N
djibouti Y Y Y N
georgia Y Y Y Y
indonesia Y Y Y N
korea Y Y Y N
liberia Y Y N Y
marshall islands Y Y N Y
moldova Y Y Y N
namibia Y Y Y Y
nicaragua N * Y N
paraguay N N Y Y
philippines Y Y Y N
seychelles Y Y N Y
sri lanka Y Y N Y
tajikistan N Y N N
tunisia Y Y Y N
Uruguay Y N Y Y
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table 3: internal oversight tools in presidential countries (continued)              
country motion of censure
hearings in 
commit.
comm. of 
inquiry missions reports
Argentina Y Y Y N Y
benin N Y Y Y N
burundi Y Y Y Y N
chile Y Y N N Y
congo N Y Y Y Y
costa rica Y Y Y N Y
cote d’ivoire N N Y N N
cyprus N Y Y N Y
djibouti N Y Y Y Y
georgia Y Y Y N Y
indonesia N Y Y Y N
korea N Y Y N Y
liberia Y Y Y Y Y
marshall 
islands Y Y Y N Y
moldova Y Y N N Y
namibia Y Y Y Y Y
nicaragua N Y Y N Y
paraguay Y Y Y N Y
philippines N Y Y N N
seychelles Y Y Y N N
sri lanka Y Y Y N N
tajikistan N N N N N
tunisia Y Y N Y N
Uruguay Y Y Y Y Y
note: y indicates that a legislature has such an oversight tool, n indicates that the legislature does not 
employ this oversight tool, while * means that information on the presence/absence of this oversight tool 
was not provided.
For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 3).
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External oversight tools
Extra-legislative accountability institutions are established “to enhance accountability of gov-
ernment, which operate outside [the legislature] and the political process expressed through 
[the legislature]” (Evans 1991, page 1). Their creation paradoxically has been “largely driven by 
a perception of the inadequacy of [the legislature] as an accountability mechanism.” Although 
there are additional mechanisms, literature distinguishes three primary institutions:2 supreme 
audit institutions (SAIs), anti-corruption agencies and ombuds offices.
Supreme audit Institutions
Financial, legal (compliance) and, often, performance (“value-for-money”) audits of government 
revenue and spending are undertaken by SAIs. 
The relationship between legislatures and SAIs is often symbiotic: legislature depends on SAI to 
submit reliable and timely information. The SAI depends on the legislature to provide a public 
forum for presenting and discussing audit results and recommendations for corrective action. 
In many countries the constitution mandates SAIs to be appointed by, and to report to, the 
legislature. The legislature also often approves the SAI’s budget. This ensures their independence.
There are three broad SAI models: the Westminster model (also known as the Anglo-Saxon or 
parliamentary model), the Board or Collegiate model and the judicial or Napoleonic model 
(Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2001). All three types of audit models can be found in countries with 
presidential forms of government. In countries with a Westminster tradition, be they parliamentary, 
semi-presidential or presidential, the SAI works closely with a dedicated legislative committee 
(e.g., the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), state audit committees, budget or finance commit-
tees) or sub-committee and may even provide the committee with special technical assistance. 
Research shows that perceived corruption levels are significantly higher in countries which have 
the judicial or Napoleonic model (Blume and Voight, 2007; French, forthcoming).
anti-corruption agencies
Anti-corruption agencies are common around the world, especially in countries with semi-pres-
idential and presidential forms of government. There are four models: 
1. The universal model, which combines investigative, preventative and communications 
functions.
2. The investigative model, which is characterized by a small and centralized investigative 
commission.
3. The multi-agency model, which includes several offices across government departments 
that are individually distinct but together form a web of agencies to curb corruption. 
4. The parliamentary model, which includes anti-corruption agencies that report directly to 
the legislature and are independent from the executive and judiciary. 
2 The financial crisis has induced several European nations to consider the possibility of adopting ‘fiscal councils’, 
bodies composed by specialists with technical expertise, which should be given the task to perform both an ex 
ante and ex post oversight of fiscal and budgetary issues. Some such ‘fiscal councils’ have already been created 
(Belgium, Germany, UK). While all of them are expected to be independent from the influence of both the execu-
tive and the legislative branches of government, some ‘fiscal councils’ are expected to support the performance 
of legislative oversight while others are intended to aid the executive.
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Performance of anti-corruption agencies has generally been disappointing. They are often 
‘captured’ by the government to protect its own leadership and/or to harass opposition leaders. 
There have been no cross-country analyses of the effectiveness of such agencies in curbing 
corruption. It can however be hypothesized that anti-corruption agencies are most effective 
when independent of government and free of political interference. In spite of the disappointing 
performance, anti-corruption agencies have become increasingly popular.
ombud offices
Originally established in Sweden in 1809, the ombuds office represents the interests of public by 
investigating and addressing complaints reported by individual citizens against public authorities. 
Some ombuds offices are also mandated to include human rights and mediate between citizens 
and public authorities while others - such Papua New Guinea, Uganda and Namibia - have an 
explicit anti-corruption mandate.
In some countries (e.g., Belgium), the ombuds office may, based on the legislature’s request, 
investigate a particular administration. Impetus for legislative oversight is reinforced by the 
ombuds office, as it ensures that its outcome is widely available to the media and general public. 
Decisions of ombuds offices are mostly non-binding and their powers are limited to mediation 
and conciliation, guidance, recommendations and issuing reprimands. In a very few countries 
(e.g., Finland, Sweden), ombuds offices can initiate criminal prosecutions.
Ombuds offices have many different names and there are significant differences among such 
offices across countries. Some of these differences concern institutionalization, appointment, 
length and renewability of the term in office, mandate, amount of resources at its disposal and 
its ability to sanctions wrongdoers. 
External oversight tools in Presidential systems
Table 4 illustrates that overwhelming majority of legislatures in presidential systems have all 
three external oversight tools, five countries have only two of the three tools, while one country 
(Marshall Islands) has only one. 
SAIs are found in all 24 countries included in our study. Anti-corruption agencies exist in in 21 
countries (87.5 per cent) and ombuds offices in 20 countries (86.9 per cent), with Liberia not 
responding on the latter. The average number of external oversight tools is nearly 2.8 out of 3.3 
3 This finding indicates a clear difference between internal and external oversight tools. Since the number of 
internal oversight tools about which information was collected is much higher than the number of external over-
sight tools about which information was sought, it is not surprising that, in absolute terms, the average number 
of internal oversight tools available to a legislature is considerably higher than the average number of external 
oversight tools. The picture is quite different, however, if instead of considering absolute values we consider 
relative values—the average number of tools divided by the total number of tools that could be adopted at 
most. In this regard, we would find that in relative terms in presidential system the external capacity exceeds 
the internal capacity. In fact, the internal capacity amounts on average to 6.2/9, which equals 68.8, whereas the 
external capacity amounts on average to 2.73/3, which equals 91.2.  
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table 4: external oversight tools in presidential countries                  
country supreme Audit institutions
Anti-corruption 
agencies ombudsman
Argentina Y Y Y
Benin Y Y Y
Burundi Y Y N
Chile Y N Y
Congo Y Y Y
Costa Rica Y Y Y
Cote d’Ivoire Y Y Y
Cyprus Y Y Y
Djibouti Y Y Y
Georgia Y Y Y
Indonesia Y Y Y
Korea Y Y N
Liberia Y Y *
Marshall Islands Y N N
Moldova Y Y Y
Namibia Y Y Y
Nicaragua Y Y Y
Paraguay Y Y Y
The Philippines Y Y Y
Seychelles Y N Y
Sri Lanka Y Y Y
Tajikistan Y Y Y
Tunisia Y Y Y
Uruguay Y Y Y
note: y indicates that a legislature has such an oversight tool, n indicates that the legislature does not 
employ this oversight tool, while * means that information on the presence/absence of this oversight tool 
was not provided.
For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 4).
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does this matter?
Research indicates that legislatures in parliamentary systems, richer and more democratic coun-
tries are better equipped than those operating in less-democratic, middle and low income 
countries with presidential and semi-presidential systems. The number of tools that parliaments 
may have to oversee the activities and the expenditures of the executive don’t matter much. It 
is even more important to have conducive external environment, facilitating factors that support 
oversight, and desire, political will and determination of legislatures to utilize available tools. 
We now turn to these issues.
facilitating conditions
We examine the inter-twined facilitating conditions of information and legislative research 
capacity, and pay particular attention to financial information systems
Information
Information is very important for the functioning of democratic legislatures. Moreover, the need 
for information is probably even greater in democratizing (and developing) countries, in which 
“substantive, policy-relevant information is often exclusively the province of the executive-the 
government” (Lowenberg and Patterson, 1979, p. 164). In these countries, the legislative branch 
needs free (of government influence) and reliable information to understand government choices, 
decisions and policies; to assess whether they are valuable or not and, if not, to criticize them 
and propose policy alternatives. Not surprisingly, legislatures’ inability to keep governments 
accountable for their actions, such as, for example, the drafting of the budget and the ensuing 
allocation of resources often reflects legislatures’ lack of independent – from executives’ con-
trol – information or their inability to process the available information. If the only information 
available to the legislature is provided by the executive branch or by one of its agencies, if there 
is no information available to the legislature, or if the legislature is unable to understand the 
available information, then the legislature cannot question in any substantive way the content 
of government choices, decisions and actions4. 
The information and the knowledge that legislators and legislatures require in order to adequately 
perform their functions and tasks is provided by institutions outside and inside the legislature. 
Outside sources of information are varied; one of the most important for oversight is that from 
routine reports generated by government management information systems (MIS); see Box 3. 
The principal internal institutions include parliamentary libraries and the legislative institutes. These 
two institutions differ from one another in several respects: parliamentary libraries are always part 
of the legislatures, whereas institutes may be established inside or outside the legislature. Second, 
unlike parliamentary libraries that always have the task of carrying out research on the legislature’s 
behalf and of providing the legislature with the information it needs, legislative institutes may have 
very limited research capacity and may not be formal sources of information. Finally, empirical 
analyses have revealed that while it is generally uncommon for parliamentary libraries to provide 
legislators with training, there are some institutes whose mandate is precisely that.
4 This point is well recognized in the literature. Loewenberg and Patterson noted, in this respect, that “the 
availability of sources of information independent of executive agencies improves the ability of the legislature 
to exert influence over the executive branch”, see Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, Comparing 
Legislatures, op. cit., p. 164.
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Parliamentary libraries perform several functions - they are a home for books, they provide 
reference service by looking up facts, sources and available bibliographic material, they make 
available copies of specific items and they provide clipping service of relevant articles in the 
press and, “nearly all legislatures have parliamentary libraries to assist them in obtaining and 
using information in their deliberations” (Robinson, 1998, page 815).
BoX 3: IntEGrAtEd fInAncIAl  
MAnAGEMEnt InforMAtIon systEM
Generally, the term “IFMIS” refers to the use of information and communications tech-
nology in financial operations to support management and budget decisions, fiduciary 
responsibilities, and the preparation of financial reports and statements. 
In the government realm, IFMIS refers more specifically to the computerization of public 
financial management (PFM) processes, from budget preparation and execution to ac-
counting and reporting, with the help of an integrated system for financial management 
of line ministries, spending agencies and other public sector operations. 
In order to promote transparency and reduce corruption, parliaments can be given access 
to a comprehensive system addressing Budget, Revenue, Expenditure Control, Debt, 
Resource Management, Human Resources, Payroll, Accounting, Financial Reporting, and 
Auditing processes across central government or even including local government and 
other public sector and quasi-governmental agencies and operations. The principal element 
that “integrates” an IFMIS is a common, single, reliable platform database (or a series of 
interconnected databases) to and from which all data expressed in financial terms flow. 
Integration is the key to any successful IFMIS. In a nutshell, integration implies that the 
system has the following basic features: 
1. Standard data classification for recording financial events;
2. Internal controls over data entry, transaction processing, and reporting; and
3. Common processes for similar transactions and a system design that eliminates 
unnecessary duplication of data entry
An IFMIS stores, organizes and makes access to financial information easy. It not only stores 
all the financial information relating to current and past years’ spending, but also stores 
the approved budgets for these years, details on inflows and outflows of funds, as well as 
inventories of financial assets (e.g., equipment, land and buildings) and liabilities (debt). 
By recording information into an integrated system that uses common values, IFMIS 
users can access the system and extract the specific information they require to carry out 
different functions and tasks. 
All manner of reports can be generated: balance sheets, sources and uses of funds, cost 
reports, returns on investment, aging of receivables and payables, cash flow projections, 
budget variances, and performance reports of all types. 
The oversight function of the legislature will be strengthened because this information 
can be used by monitoring committee secretariat to examine results against budgets and 
plans; manage cash balances; track the status of debts and receivables; monitor the use 
of fixed assets; monitor the performance of specific departments or units. 
For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 5).
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contextual factors
Contextual factors include the type of government, the electoral system, political parties, social 
legitimacy, the political culture, administrative structure, external actors and patrons and interest 
groups5. The form of government has been considered above. Here, we review the other factors.
electoral system
The electoral system is important in terms of the conduct and nature of elections. It has been 
suggested that the juxtaposition between form of government and electoral system is a de-
cisive factor in legislature’s oversight power. For example, presidential systems, coupled with 
single-member plurality systems, like that of the United States, tend to produce two relatively 
strong cohesive parties and thus the potential for stronger oversight while parliamentary systems 
with proportional representation tend to produce multi-party coalition governments, again 
with a potential for stronger oversight. Presidentialism and proportional representation, which 
characterizes many political systems in Latin America have led not only to gridlock, but to 
presidents having to bargain with disorganized and fragmented parties6. Parliamentarianism with 
single member plurality systems, like that in the United Kingdom, tends to result in executive 
dominance. This argument is presented in Diagram 8.
political parties
Legislative oversight takes place in a broader political context. However, political party dynamics 
tend to be more fluid than constitutional provisions or electoral systems. Political parties are 
part of the mediating institutions between government and citizens and oversight is mediated 
to some extent via the struggle and competition between political parties. 
Cooperation between governing and opposition parties is an important element of constructive 
and efficient governance, particularly when it comes to oversight. It has been suggested that 
legislators have a responsibility to put the welfare of the country above that of narrow party 
concerns when they are exercising their oversight function, regardless of their party affiliation. 
5  It is difficult to make a straightforward distinction between some of the contextual factors and variables internal 
to the legislature (for instance, political parties function outside and inside the legislature) while other variables 
overlap and experts may use different names for similar variables.
6 At the same time, parliamentary systems combined with party-list proportional representation may also hinder 
oversight as “[W]hen the parliamentary careers of MPs depend on their placement on their party’s list, the last 
thing they should want to do is to engage in activity that challenges the policies and actions of their own party’s 
government” (Bach quoted in National Democratic Institute, 2000, p. 20). Going further, Gerring and Thacker 
(2004) demonstrate that countries with parliamentary forms of government and proportional representation tend 
to have lower levels corruption, as the resulting governments tend to be weaker, with smaller majorities and/
or a coalition of political parties. These authors suggest that both these characteristics strengthen a parliament’s 
oversight capability. 
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It has also been suggested that two variables, both of which can be applied to oversight more 
generally, shape the political party balance of power in the context of which legislatures exercise 
their oversight function: 
1. political party majorities: Stable political party majorities in the legislature help to ensure 
the predictability of voting outcomes. The same is true of a two-party system which can, 
especially in parliamentary systems, constrain a legislature through a disciplined and co-
hesive majority party. While potentially more stable, these first two may restrict oversight. 
Conversely, coalition governments, or a “several” party system, may lead to increased 
oversight. At the same time, a highly fragmented party system can incapacitate the 
legislature, leaving it incapable of making decisions, and opposition parties can be subject 
to severe criticism if they are perceived as merely being obstructionist.  
2. party cohesion. The second variable is (intra) party cohesion, as party majorities only 
ensure the predictability of legislative behavior when matched with tight party discipline. 
Party cohesion “…entails voting along party lines, even if the outcome does not fully 
match the preferences of the individual legislator.” Where party cohesion is strong, there 
may be less opportunity for legislators from the governing party to play an objective 
oversight role.
diagram 8: presidential/parliamentary forms of government and electoral systems         
single-member  
plurality system
proportional  
representation
Presidential Strong Oversight Weak Oversight
Parliamentary Weak Oversight Strong Oversight
Social legitimacy
According to Wang (2005, p. 6), “the degree of social legitimacy attained by the legislature 
is reflective of its strength and position vis-à-vis the executive. Moreover, social legitimacy in 
combination with influence on the policy process provides an indication of the future position of 
a legislature in the political system”. Election turnouts, media coverage (and whether the public 
follows this coverage, e.g., parliamentary sittings broadcast on television or radio) and opinion 
polls provide some evidence of public perceptions of legislatures. Key questions include “…to 
what extent [is the public] supportive of parliament? Is it respected and trusted? Is the legislature 
seen as a ‘rubber stamp’ or is it believed to have the ability to exert influence on the executive? 
Are legislators seen as self-seeking and corrupt or as competent and hardworking?” 
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level of Democracy
The Freedom House computes an annual index of freedom for all countries in the world. This 
index is regarded by many social scientists as a proxy indicator for democracy. Research shows 
that the more democratic a country, the greater the number of oversight tools available to the 
legislature and that the more democratic a country, the greater the potential for oversight and 
the lower the level of corruption. 
contextual factors and facilitating conditions in Presidential systems
There is great variation in the extent to which parliamentary libraries can assist parliamentarians. 
These differences do not reflect whether the legislatures in question are parliamentary, semi-pres-
idential or presidential but rather mostly reflect differences in available resources such as the size 
of the collection, the number of yearly acquisitions, the number of periodicals, the number of 
newspapers, the size of the staff and the size of the research staff. Table 5 indicates that there is 
considerable difference in each of the variables of interest. The size of the collection varies from 
50 to 2 million books, the number of acquisitions varies from a minimum of 10 to a maximum 
of 85,000, the number of periodical varies from 1 to 14,350, the number of newspapers varies 
from 0 to 823, the number of staff varies from 1 to 900 members, while the size of the research 
staff varies from a minimum of 0 (zero) to a maximum of 53.
Our analysis suggests that the size of the collection, the number of yearly acquisitions, the number 
of periodicals, the number of newspapers, the size of the staff are positively, but weakly related 
to oversight effectiveness, whereas the number of the research staff is positively and strongly, 
related to oversight effectiveness7. In other words, research capacity is a key determinant of 
oversight effectiveness; indeed, this factor alone has a greater impact on oversight effectiveness 
than both internal and external oversight capacity.
7 In both correlations, however, the coefficient is insignificant; this may be caused by the small size of the 
sample—for we do not have as many data on research staff as we do on other aspects of oversight capacity. 
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table 5: facilitating conditions in presidential countries                     
year of 
foundation
size of 
collection 
(number 
of books)
yearly  
acquisitions
number 
of  
periodicals
number 
of daily 
papers
staff 
(number 
of staff 
members)
research 
staff
Argentina 1856 2000000 2100 8700 7 900 N.A
Benin 1993 900 N.A 50 5 1 N.A
Burundi 1995 50 50 12 15 2 1
Chile 1883 1500000 41100 1890 30 145 53
Congo 1993 15200 N.A 33 4 15 2
Costa Rica 1953 33500 1200 600 23 3
Cote 
d’Ivoire N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A
Cyprus 1960 11400 300 20 13 1 0
Djibuti 1977 2000 40 2 5 2
Georgia 1994 5000 200 126 3
Indonesia 1946 150000 3000 17 21 18
Korea- 
Rep. of 1952 1170000 85000 14350 823 276 23
Liberia N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A
Marshall 
Islands N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A
Moldova 1978 11400 60 112 N.A N.A N.A
Namibia 1990 2000 500 5 2 1
Nicaragua 1980 28000 300 150 8 10 N.A
Paraguay 1992 2000 30 1 0 2 N.A
Philippins 1987 40726 1566 167 22 35 6
Seychelles N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A
Sri Lanka 1927 33000 400 35 30 14 2
Tajikistan N.A 400 10 5 5 1 N.A
Tunisia 1956 10000 150 55 25 7 N.A
Uruguay 1928 250000 5000 2500 16 146 N.A
Source: Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2013)
(For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 5).
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PuttInG It All toGEtHEr
Neither internal nor external oversight tools, facilitating conditions or contextual 
factors, alone explain levels of corruption. Rather, the difference in oversight is 
explained by a combination of all three sets of variables together.
A unique tool to measure oversight is the “Stapenhurst-Pelizzo Index of Leg-
islative Oversight” or SPILO. This tool uses a framework that views legislative 
oversight as a process, where legislative oversight as a policy instruments with 
a distinct policy aim to improve accountability and to reduce corruption.
Recognizing that it is the combination of internal and external oversight tools, 
supporting conditions and contextual factors that best explain legislative over-
sight, we present a framework of legislative oversight (see Diagram 8).
At the heart of the diagram are the oversight tools and contextual factors. There 
is a two-way relationship between these variables. Contextual factors influence 
the number of oversight tools available to a legislature. There is reason to believe 
that the greater number of oversight tools used by legislatures in parliamentary 
systems may reflect the relative weakness of contextual factors in such systems, 
relative to presidential systems (Stapenhurst, 2011). 
The framework suggests further that contextual factors are driven more by 
a country’s social-political history than by notions of international templates 
associated with international best practice. Here, the concept of templates 
associates with archetypes and path dependency is important. For example, 
former British colonies usually have a parliamentary form of government, a 
majoritarian electoral system while former French colonies have a semi-presi-
dential form of government and a proportional representation electoral system 
and the former Spanish colonies in Latin America are presidential systems with 
proportional representation. The framework also acknowledges the importance 
of social capital – public trust in parliament, which acts as the glue which helps 
hold the framework together.
A key issue remains, however – how can this conceptual framework be opera-
tionalized, so as to be of practical importance to legislatures and parliamentary 
strengthening organizations alike?
operationalizing the Framework: the Stapenhurst-pelizzo Index 
of legislative oversight (SpIlo)
The presence of a large number of oversight tools is by itself insufficient to 
ensure that oversight activities are carried out effectively; legislators may not use 
the oversight tools that are placed at their disposal, or may use them in rather 
ineffective way. As we have shown, contextual factors are crucial in understanding 
whether, how and to what extent oversight activities are performed effectively. 
5
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diagram 9: synthesized conceptual framework              
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Using data concerning the level of democracy and executive constraint from Polity IV8, on 
oversight from a survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the World Bank Institute 
and on the size of the legislative staff and libraries from Miller, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, (2004), 
we construct an oversight index. We then used this index to investigate the relationship between 
legislative oversight, as measured by SPILO (which combines two components oversight capacity 
and the context) and oversight effectiveness. 
We measure oversight capacity on the basis of seven dimensions, namely the presence/absence 
of parliamentary questions, specialized oversight committees, inquiry committees, an ombuds 
office, whether the ombudsman is appointed by the legislature plus the legislature’s ability to 
impeach the executive, and the size of the legislative staff. By combining the scores on these 
variables we determine an Index of Internal Oversight capacity (IOC), whose score ranges from 
0 (no capacity) to 1.0 (maximum capacity); these scores are presented in Table 6.
8 Polity IV provides, on a yearly basis, an assessment of the state of democracy and on executive constraints – a 
proxy for legislative oversight - for every country in the world. 
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table 6: index of oversight capacity (ioc)                  
country Questions impeach. specialized committees
inquiry 
committees ombuds
ombuds 
appointed 
by  
legislature
staff index
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.00
Benin 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.63
Burundi 1 1 * 1 0 0 0 0.38
Chile 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.75
Congo 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.63
Costa 
Rica 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,88
Cote 
d’Ivoire 1 0 * 1 1 0 * -
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 .5 0 0.69
Djibuti 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.63
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.75
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.88
Korea- 
Rep. of 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.63
Liberia 1 1 1 1 0 0 * -
Marshall 
Islands 1 0 1 1 0 0 * -
Moldova 1 1 * 0 1 1 * -
Namibia 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.63
Nicaragua 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.50
Paraguay 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.63
Philippins 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.75
Seychelles 1 1 1 1 1 0 * -
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.75
Tajikistan 0 1 1 0 1 .5 0 0.44
Tunisia 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.38
Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.00
Legend. * = data missing
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As noted, overall oversight capacity refers to both internal capacity and to contextual conditions. 
One of the most important contextual conditions is the level or quality of democracy - while 
having some capacity to oversee the executive may influence the effectiveness of the oversight 
activity, it is clear that if there is limited political will to put that oversight capacity to good use, 
actual oversight will never be performed effectively. Hence, to capture the role that the context 
plays in making legislative oversight effective, and to assess the causal impact that the quality 
of democracy may have on oversight effectiveness, we compute the SPILO by multiplying the 
IOC by the Polity 2 score (the state of democracy). Thus: 
In other words, the legislature of Uruguay has the highest oversight capacity among the 24 
countries included in our study. It has the highest score in terms of IOC and in terms of contextual 
conditions and, as a result, has the highest SPILO. This also means that insofar as legislative 
oversight effectiveness is a function or a consequence of legislative oversight capacity, we 
expect the Uruguayan legislature to be a more effective overseer than legislatures that have a 
lower SPILO. 
By performing this computation for all the countries included in our study, we obtain the scores 
presented in table 7. There is a huge variation in oversight effectiveness across countries, with 
Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica having the highest levels and the strongest oversight and Congo, 
Tajikistan and Tunisia having the weakest. 
table 7: ioc, polity 2 score and spilo                 
country ioc polity 2 spilo
Argentina 1 8 8.00
Benin 0,63 7 4.38
Burundi 0,38 6 2.25
Chile 0,75 10 7.50
Congo 0,63 -4 -2.50
Costa Rica 0,875 10 8.75
Cote d’Ivoire * * *
Cyprus 0,688 10 6.88
Djibouti 0,625 2 1.25
Georgia 0,75 6 4.50
Indonesia 0,88 8 7.00
Korea 0,63 8 5.00
Liberia * 6 *
Marshall Islands * * *
spilo = ioc * polity 2
Using spilo, Uruguay takes the following value: 
spilo = 1+1+1+1+1+1+2 * 10 = 10
8
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table 7: ioc, polity 2 score and spilo (continued)            
country ioc polity 2 spilo
Moldova * 8 *
Namibia 0,63 6 3.75
Nicaragua 0,5 9 4.50
Paraguay 0,63 8 5.00
Philippines 0,75 8 6.00
Seychelles * * *
Sri Lanka 0,75 6 4.50
Tajikistan 0,44 -3 -1.31
Tunisia 0,38 -4 -1.50
Uruguay 1 10 10.0
Legend: * indicates missing value 
The SPILO has a great value as a diagnostic tool and has wide policy implications. First, it pre-
dicts nearly perfectly the effectiveness with which a legislature performs its oversight function 
(see Figure 1). Hence, the practical lesson to be learned is that, in order to increase oversight 
effectiveness (which is so important for curbing corruption), the oversight capacity of legislatures 
(as measured by the SPILO) must be increased.
figure 1: spilo and oversight effectiveness               
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The second lesson is that the SPILO is major predictor of political stability. In countries where 
legislatures are endowed with greater oversight capacity (as measured by the SPILO) and which 
effectively perform their oversight tasks, policies, policy-making and the political system as a 
whole enjoy higher levels of legitimacy and stability. The data presented in figure 2 demonstrates 
that where the SPILO is higher, there is more political stability, more legitimacy and less violence. 
Hence, in order to stabilize and consolidate a political system, the oversight capacity (SPILO) of 
legislatures must be enhanced.
figure 2: spilo and political stability              
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Third, legislatures with a higher SPILO are more effective in curbing corruption. The data pre-
sented in figure 3 make indicate that, as the SPILO increases, so does the the legislature`s ability 
to control corruption. Hence, the of strengthening legislative oversight capacity (as measured 
by the SPILO) is essential for curbing corruption.
(For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 6).
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dEvEloPInG A dynAMIc APProAcH
There is one more step. Evidence provided by a Study Group organized by 
GOPAC and WBI and hosted by the European Parliament held in Brussels in 
2012 highlighted the fact that legislative oversight is performed effectively 
when the overseers (legislators, legislative committees, parliaments) have an 
interest in effectively overseeing the actions of the executive. In other words, a 
legislature effectively engages in an oversight activity when it has the reasonable 
expectation of deriving a benefit (material, symbolic or otherwise) from one or 
more of the outcomes that the oversight process can generate.
There are, however, times when a legislature may not have the political will to 
oversee the executive, times when a legislature is noted more for its acquies-
cence than for its determination to keep the government accountable. In these 
instances, when legislators refrain from performing their oversight role in an 
effective manner. They do not have the will to effectively oversee the executive 
because they believe that they may gain more, individually and collectively, from 
being ineffective overseers than from being effective overseers.
figure 3: spilo and control of corruption              
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In other words, the presence/absence of a political will reflects the structure of incentives con-
fronting legislators. The implication is if the structure of incentives changes, a legislature that 
was previously content avoiding its oversight tasks may find plenty of incentives to engage in 
effective oversight of the executive. But how can the structure of incentives be modified? 
As soon as voters demand that the government be held accountable for its actions, the structure 
of incentives shifts and it becomes more rewarding for legislators to engage in effective oversight 
and to oversee the government actions. This means that it is sufficient to generate or stimulate 
voter demands for accountability in order to ensure that oversight activities will be effectively 
performed by the legislature. If voter demand exists for more effective oversight, then there will 
be clear benefits for legislators to introduce accountability procedures.
If there is a popular demand for good government, then there will be an electoral niche that 
will reward legislators who engage in oversight to ensure accountable governance; when this 
occurs, then it will be in the self-interest of legislators to perform oversight. In the absence of such 
demand, or when voters are satisfied with only window dressing instead of real accountability, 
it will not be in the interests of legislators to engage in effective oversight. See Diagram 10. 
diagram 10: strategic interaction model                   
Hence, any effort to increase the effectiveness of oversight activities and promote accountability 
involves two steps: give legislatures the tools to oversee the executive and stimulate legislatures’ 
willingness to use them.
For more details, see Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight  
(Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst) chapter 7).
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